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Opportunities or Threats: The Rise of Online Collaborative Consumption (OCC) 
and its Impact on New Car Sales 
 
Abstract 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Online collaborative consumption models, such as Uber and Airbnb, have emerged as popular 
peer-to-peer platforms in the sharing economy. The recent introduction of ride-hailing apps for 
smartphones has generated a powerful medium for passengers to call cars effortlessly and 
flexible job opportunities for drivers. A central question surrounding the introduction of online 
collaborative consumption regards its impact on incumbent firms. For example, ride-hailing 
services could discourage private car ownership, potentially leading to a subsequent decline of 
new car sales. Our study investigates whether the adoption of a leading ride-hailing platform, 
Didi Chuxing, increases or decreases new car sales shortly after the platform’s entries across 
51 cities in China. Our empirical results suggest that the initial entry of a dominant ride-hailing 
company like Didi Chuxing positively impacts new car sales in the short run.  However, we 
suspect that this positive effect will be transitory.  Whether the auto industry can leverage the 
ride-hailing platforms to achieve sustainable benefits remains to be seen in the long run. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Keywords: collaborative consumption models, propensity-score matching, network effects, 
ride-hailing services, sharing economy, two-sided platforms. 
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“Our intention is to make Uber so efficient, cars so highly utilized that for most people it is 
cheaper than owning a car…” Travis Kalanick, former CEO of Uber. 
 
“I hope you give up buying a car, driving in traffic through a busy city can be boring…” Jean 
Liu, President of Didi Chuxing. 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last few years, the rapid proliferation of smartphones and the associated widespread 
use of mobile phone applications has fueled the rapid growth of Internet-enabled sharing 
platforms around the world, such as those of Uber, Airbnb, Lyft, Turo, and Peerby. These 
emerging online peer-to-peer platforms, collectively known as the ‘sharing economy’, have 
made a great deal of money by enabling individuals to share their under-utilized resources. 
Anecdotal evidence has shown that incumbent firms in the private car hire, hotel and other 
industries are facing fierce competition from these sharing economy companies (e.g., Barro, 
2014; Fischer-Baum and Bialik, 2015; Guttentag, 2015; Cramer and Krueger, 2016). For 
instance, eMarketer (2016) estimated that nearly 15 million adults used the ride-hailing services 
from Uber, Lyft or other companies at least once in 2016, an increase of 20.5% from 2015. 
According to Knight (2016), every week in London, 30,000 consumers order a car service 
through Uber, which has successfully launched its ride-hailing platform in over 66 countries 
and 507 cities around the world (Uber, 2016). These ride-hailing services operate as mobile 
platforms that connect individuals who want to use cars with drivers – people who would like 
to share their cars. Uber now has a $66 billion valuation: higher than those of several well-
known U.S. public companies such as Ford, GM, Fox, Time-Warner Cable, and eBay (Rosoff, 
2015).  
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Our study investigates the impact of ride-hailing companies on the new car market by using 
a unique dataset of vehicle registrations from China — the biggest emerging auto market in the 
world. We focus on China’s homegrown ride-hailing platform Didi Chuxing1. There are several 
plausible reasons that suggest the adoption of ride-hailing apps could negatively impact new 
car sales. From the perspective of passengers, using ride-hailing apps benefits from ease of 
booking, lower prices, quick response, and plenty of driver options. Compared to taxi services, 
using a ride-hailing service is extremely convenient and often much cheaper. As the use of ride-
hailing apps becomes more prevalent, more and more people may find car ownership 
unnecessary. Unlike catching a taxi, which requires passengers to stand on the street until an 
available vehicle drives by, and where payment is sometimes inconveniently cash only, the 
adoption of ride-hailing apps allows passengers to summon a car via a smartphone, making 
payment electronically. Recent reports show that many Uber users are holding off on car 
purchase because of the availability of ride-hailing services (Diamicis, 2015). Taxi firms facing 
higher fixed costs have started to view competition from these ride-hailing companies as a 
serious threat.  Many of them consequently have become more reluctant to acquire new cars. 
On the other hand, it is plausible that the adoption of ride-hailing apps may positively 
impact new car sales by generating new suppliers (i.e., drivers). For example, according to 
Fiegerman (2014), Uber creates around 50,000 new job opportunities globally each month. 
Because ride-hailing apps provide a great deal of flexibility to drivers as they can choose to 
work at any time, tens of thousands of people have joined ride-hailing platforms as full-time or 
part-time drivers.  In order to become a ride-hailing driver, an individual must have a car (or 
purchase one) and the car must meet the vehicle requirements of the ride-hailing firm. Thus, 
automotive manufacturing industry may benefit from the incremental demand created by the 
ride-hailing firms like Uber.  Moreover, some auto dealers such as Toyota’s dealers provide 
                         
1 As the result of a merger between two major ride-hailing firms, Didi Dache and Kuaidi, Didi Chuxing has become the most 
dominant ride-hailing company in China, accumulating more than 400 million users in 400 Chinese cities. 
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flexible leasing options to cooperative ride-hailing drivers (e.g., those of Uber) who are not 
eligible in applying for loans from banks or other financial institutions because of poor credit 
scores (Lutz, 2015).  
The overall impact of ride-hailing apps on new car sales remains as an empirical question. 
Previous research has examined the impact of introducing ride-hailing apps on local regulations 
(e.g., Rauch and Schleicher, 2015; Ranchordás, 2015; Cohen and Sundararajan, 2015), the 
market of ride-hailing (e.g., Zha et al., 2016), and the algorithm optimization of ride-hailing 
apps (e.g., Agatz et al., 2011). However, the impact of ride-hailing on new car demand has not 
been formally examined and understood. In this paper, we aim to bridge this gap by 
investigating how the adoption of ride-hailing apps affects new car sales.  
Our paper contributes to the extant literature from several aspects. By providing empirical 
evidence of the economic impact associated with the sharing economy, our study is among the 
first few studies that focus on the interplay between the sharing economy and traditional mature 
industries. Our research provides compelling empirical evidence demonstrating that the entry 
of Didi Chuxing can meaningfully increase new car sales in the short run. In addition, the 
granular characteristics of our dataset allows us to examine the impacts of Didi Chuxing’s entry 
on new car sales from different categories, such as economy, business and luxury. Identifying 
the types of cars significantly affected by Didi Chuxing’s entry can help policy makers and 
regulators better understand the policy implications for the emerging ride-hailing platforms.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first review the related extant 
literature in Section 2. Subsequently, in Section 3, we explain the data and research design used 
in the study. We then delineate the base model and its extensions in Section 4. Section 5 
summarizes the results of our statistical analyses. Finally, we discuss the implications and the 
limitations of our study in the last section. 
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2. Prior Literature 
In this section, we review various streams of relevant literature, including previous research on 
digital two-sided platforms and car sharing.  
2.1 Digital Two-Sided Platforms 
Internet-enabled two-sided platforms have profoundly changed business practices, social 
activities and economic activities by working as Internet intermediaries between suppliers and 
consumers (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Bailey and Bakos, 1997; Brynjolfsson et al., 2003; 
Constantinides and Barrett, 2014; Tilson et al., 2010). One major stream of research on two-
sided platforms examines their impacts on social and public issues (Chan and Ghose, 2013; 
Greenwood and Agarwal, 2015; Alexander and Gonzalez, 2015; Greenwood and Wattal, 2015; 
Chasin and Scholta, 2015). Investigating the antecedents and consequences related to 
individuals’ participation in different online two-sided platforms is another topic that has 
received extensive attention in the research (e.g., Kim, et al., 2015; Abramova et al., 2015; 
Weber, 2016; Gerber and Hui, 2013; Burtch et al., 2013). Other recent studies on individuals’ 
participation and decision mechanisms in crowdfunding platforms include Agarwal et al. 
(2011), Lin and Viswanathan (2014) and Wei and Lin (2015). Finally, some research on online 
two-sided platforms examines their substitution and complementarity effects on incumbent 
firms offering similar goods or services (Cusumano 2015; Malhotra and Van Alstyne, 2014).  
While these studies have uncovered a multitude of issues regarding digital two-sided 
platforms across a variety of aspects, the relationship between the presence of Internet-enabled 
two-sided platforms and the overall demand for purchasing sharing goods is far from clear 
(Horton and Zeckhauser, 2016; Jiang and Tian, 2016). Our paper aims to ameliorate this 
research gap by examining the impact of ride-hailing platforms on new car sales in China. 
Because we examine the impact on new car sales shortly after the entry of a dominant two-
sided platform, we can investigate whether the cross-side network effects are sufficiently strong 
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to incentivize large-scale new driver participation. By providing empirical evidence of a 
positive effect of platform entries on new car sales, our study demonstrates that the positive 
cross-side network effects generated by a dominant platform can quickly overwhelm the same-
side negative network effects (note that on the driver side the competition for riders intensifies 
as more drivers sign up for the same platform).         
2.2 Car Sharing 
Focusing specifically on the car-sharing business model, a stream of research has investigated 
the effects of car-sharing adoption, including studies from economic, environmental and social 
perspectives, such as examining the alleviation of air and noise pollution, improving traffic 
congestion, and reducing the costs of vehicle travel (e.g., Cervero et al., 2007; Martin et al., 
2010; Jacobson and King, 2009). A key goal of the car sharing business model is to incentivize 
individuals to join the platform and share their cars with other members. Vehicles are usually 
deployed in a community or a transit station such as a bus station, airport, or railway station. 
The outcomes of this stream of studies have significant managerial implications regarding the 
question of whether the car sharing model can effectively address the environmental and 
transportation issues typically faced by metropolitan areas like New York, London and Paris. 
Jacobson and King (2009) investigate how a ride-hailing policy can reduce fuel consumption. 
They find that a reduction of 5.4% in annual fuel consumption can be achieved if one in every 
ten cars were routinely shared by passengers. Using cost-benefit analysis techniques, Fellows 
and Pitfield (2000) examine the prospect of car-sharing to ameliorate traffic congestion and 
environmental pollution through reducing vehicle kilometers, increasing average speeds and 
saving in fuel. While digital ride-hailing platforms (e.g., Uber) share similarities with traditional 
car sharing models, they are distinctively technology-driven two-sided platforms that connect 
demand and supply on a real time basis.  
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While this stream of work has investigated various benefits accrued by introducing car-
sharing policies, no previous studies have investigated whether the entry of a car-sharing 
platform with a dominant market share can meaningfully impact new car sales. On the one hand, 
because many people use ride hailing services on a non-regular basis, their car purchasing 
decisions may not be strongly influenced by the availability of ride hailing services.  On the 
other hand, there are many potential car buyers who would have purchased new cars without 
ride hailing services (therefore conveniently available ride hailing services may depress the new 
car demand from this population). From the potential Didi drivers’ perspective, their new car 
purchasing decisions need to be justified by the expected economic returns from joining the 
ride hailing platform.  It is worth noting that drivers who have already owned cars enjoy 
advantages over those potential drivers who need to purchase new cars to sign up for Didi.  
Thus, potential Didi drivers may not have enough incentives to purchase new cars if they face 
uncertain demand and significant initial costs.  However, Didi Chuxing is a leading two-sided 
platform that enjoys increasing returns to scale.2  Many studies have demonstrated that network 
effects (i.e., network externalities) have important strategic implications for competitive 
dynamics in the digital economy (e.g., Kauffman and Li, 2005; Li, 2005).  In a market with 
strong network externalities, a large network that has reached critical mass could generate 
significant new demand in a very short time period (Li, 2004; Kauffman and Li, 2005).  This 
insight is directly applicable to two-sided markets with strong cross-side network effects 
(assuming that the same-side network effects are not extremely negative).  In addition, this type 
of new demand drive by positive network feedback is often amplified by the herding mentality 
of many market players (Kauffman and Li, 2003; Li, 2004; Li et al., 2014). Therefore, Didi’s 
entries into various cities across China allow us to empirically examine whether the strong 
                         
2 According to cnbc.com and Wall Street Journal, Didi Chuxing’s market valuation could reach $80 billion in a potential IPO 
(Browne, 2018). Its gigantic market shares in the online ride-hailing business can generate powerful cross-side network effects 
that strongly incentivize new driver participation.  
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network feedback generated by a dominant network can meaningfully increase market demand 
in the short run. 
3. Research Design 
To accomplish the objective of investigating the effect of ride-hailing app entry on new car 
sales, we created a national monthly panel dataset for 102 prefecture-level cities. Among them, 
51 cities which Didi Chuxing entered in 2015 are used as the treat group while the other 51 
cities which Didi Chuxing did not enter by 2015 are used as the control group. This can be 
further justified as follows. First, according to the Diffusion of Innovations Theory (Rogers, 
2003), only a few groups of innovators are likely to adopt and use new products, while later the 
benefits of innovations are recognized by many other people. Ride-hailing apps were first 
introduced as a new service into China in 2012. Subsequently, large sums of money were spent 
aggressively on promotion, and a brutal subsidy war ensued in which competitors aimed to 
attract riders and private drivers, particularly in 20143. Thus, in 2014, the prospect of benefits 
(e.g., flexible work schedule, low travel costs, or earning a decent income) were more likely to 
crystallize in the minds of riders and drivers. More importantly, by 2015 Didi Chuxing has 
emerged as the dominant ride-hailing platform in China (Uber decided to sell its Chinese 
business to Didi Chuxing and quit the Chinese market in 2016). Consequently, when Didi 
Chuxing announced its entry into a particular new city during 2015, local residents of the city 
who wished to become full-time Didi Chuxing drivers – who did not already own a suitable car 
– were likely to purchase new cars with little hesitation. Similarly, some passengers may give 
up or delay their new car purchase plans by virtue of the established cognition that Didi Chuxing 
can effectively fulfil an unserved demand for convenient, point-to-point urban travel. Second, 
                         
3 In June 2012, Orange Technology was established and Didi Dache, the initial incarnation of Didi Chuxing's ride-hailing 
service, was launched as a mobile app for ordering taxis for immediate pick-up. In 2014, Didi Dache opened its platform to the 
private car hire market. The major investor is the Chinese Internet giant Tencent Holdings Limited.  In the same year, Uber 
launched its operations in China on February 13.  In 2015, Didi Dache decided to merge with its major local competitor, Kuai 
Di Dache, backed by the Alibaba Group, and created a new $6 billion net worth company, Didi Kuaidi. In September 2015, 
Didi Kuaidi registered its brand name as Didi Chuxing. In 2016, Uber decided to sell its Chinese business to Didi Chuxing 
and quit the Chinese market (Weinberger, 2016). 
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in February 2015, Didi Dache merged with Kuai Di Dache and the unification of these two 
companies into Didi Chuxing subsequently dominated more than 80 percent of the Chinese 
ride-hailing market as of June 2015 (TECHINASIA, 2015). As a result, a possible interaction 
effect when two or more ride-hailing apps enter into the same city at the same time can be 
significantly eliminated. Didi Chuxing, as the dominant platform provider, can significantly 
benefit from positive network externalities and herding.  Third, it takes only one or two weeks 
to buy and register a car in China. To observe the entry influence of Didi Chuxing into a city, 
we obtained new private car registration license data in the months following Didi Chuxing’s 
entry. Because Didi Chuxing gradually expanded its platform into many cities, we can capture 
the enough variation in the timing of Didi Chuxing entry across different cities and months.  
Descriptive statistics for the dataset are summarized in Table 1. We consolidated the monthly 
number of new car registration and licensing records for each city from various Chinese Vehicle 
Management Offices under the administration of the Ministry of Public Security. Appendix A 
lists Didi Chuxing’s launch time for the cities in the research treatment group sample. Using 
these official records, we developed a binary entry variable for a city during a specified month. 
To justify the latent unobservable effects influencing new car sales for each city, we 
incorporated several control variables into our base model, including demographic 
characteristics, social and economic factors, traffic intensity and the number of mobile phone 
subscriptions. These control variables for each city are mainly downloaded from the China City 
Statistical Yearbook, which is an annual official statistical report that summarizes key 
indicators related to the economic and social development of China. All key statistical data are 
available at the national level and at local levels for province, autonomous region, and 
municipality directly under the control of Central Government. Specifically, we identify per 
capita income, GDP growth rate and population size as three covariates to explain the level of 
urbanization of each location. We also computed the number of mobile phone subscriptions, 
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the geographic coverage of public transportation (i.e., the total number of registered public 
buses), and the intensity of paved roads to serve as three control variables, each of which can 
influence the use of ride-hailing apps.  
Table 1. A Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Key Variable Observation. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ln (Car Sales) 6192 7.847 0.983 5.147 10.971 
Didi Chuxing Entry 6192 0.007 0.083 0.000 1.000 
Ln (Population Size) 6192 5.840 0.688 2.986 7.080 
GDP Growth 6192 0.057 0.024 0.017 0.170 
Per Capita (Thousands) 6192 16.708 17.135 3.114 166.749 
Ln (Mobile) 6192 14.901 0.747 12.853 17.274 
Bus 6192 8.090 7.534 0.500 103.770 
Road 6192 13.249 20.751 0.590 442.950 
Taxi 6192 7.363 1.002 4.828 9.973 
Note: Per Capita (Thousands) denotes per capita income in thousands of RMB. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
4.1 The Base Model 
Didi Chuxing’s expansion into different cities over various months generates a natural 
experiment that allows us to discern the difference in new car sales after and before ride-hailing 
app entry for certain cities to the same difference for other cities that have yet to introduce the 
Didi Chuxing’s service. We capture the exogenous discrepancy in Didi Chuxing’s entry into 
various cities and months in the natural experiment as the foundation for recognizing the impact 
of its entry on new car sales. The identification approach has been employed by several prior 
studies (e.g., Dranove et al., 2003; Jin and Leslie, 2003; Zervas et al., 2017). We rely on the 
following base log regression model to capture the entry of Didi Chuxing: 
Ln(𝑌𝑐𝑡) = 𝑨𝑐 + 𝑩𝑡 + 𝑔𝒁𝑐𝑡 + 𝑝𝑹𝑐𝑡 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡        (1) 
where c represents cities and t refers to time (t = January 2015 to December 2015); Yct is the 
number of new car registration plates for city c at time t; Ac represents a vector capturing city 
fixed effects; and Bt represents a vector capturing time fixed effects. Further, Zct represents a 
vector reflecting city demographical features and socioeconomic indicators, such as, population 
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size, GDP growth rate, per capita income, the number of mobile phones possessed, per capita 
bus transportation, and per capita road kilometers. Moreover, Rct is a binary variable to indicate 
the entry of the ride-hailing app. In this case, Rct = 1 if Didi Chuxing becomes available in city 
c at time t, else Rct = 0 if not, and ect represents an error term. The coefficient p represents the 
estimation of the effect of Didi Chuxing’s entry on the number of new car sales. If p > 0, then 
the ride-hailing app expansion has contributed to an increase in new car sales. The null 
hypothesis is that the effect of Didi Chuxing’s entry on new car sales is not statistically 
significant (i.e., the p value of coefficient of a variable >0.1). In other words, Didi’s entry has 
no significantly positive or negative influence on new car sales. 
In the above model, we use city-level and time fixed effects to control for time-independent 
variances across cities and time. By incorporating these fixed effects into the base model, we 
can compare the differences of new car sales between different cities at different times. 
Moreover, we assume that demographic and socioeconomic factors possibly contribute to the 
increase of new car registrations. To justify such effects, several demographic and 
socioeconomic factors are included in the base model. We clustered the error terms at the city-
level to discern the autocorrelation in the data (Bertrand et al., 2004). In addition, our 
regressions were weighted by city population size (Carpenter, 2005). 
We realize that fixed effects model with these above covariates cannot capture latent time-
varying effects related to new car sales. To evaluate the robustness of the main results, 
following prior studies (e.g., Athey and Stern 2002), we further include time-varying control 
variables into the base model and repeat the regression. We implement this examination by 
adding interaction terms that consider the variation of cities at different time periods as follows: 
Ln(𝑌𝑐𝑡) = 𝑨𝑐 + 𝑩𝑡 + 𝑔𝒁𝑐𝑡 + 𝑝𝑹𝑐𝑡 + v𝒁𝑐𝑡𝑻𝑡 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡      (2) 
We also judge the robustness of the main outcomes related to confounding effects derived 
from unobservable variables by means of a matched sample of observations (i.e., propensity 
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score matching). We use population size, per capita income, GDP growth rate, and public 
transportation as matching characteristics and employ the nearest neighbor matching algorithm 
with replacement and caliper (0.05). Our DID analysis constructs a counterfactual outcome 
using a set of untreated cities, i.e., no Didi entry during the observation window period. The 
intuition behind matching is that the more similar treated and untreated cities are in their 
observed characteristics, the less likely they are to differ in unobserved ways, including bias-
inducing factors. Matching methods aim to reduce endogeneity concerns by ensuring 
comparability between treated and untreated units (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). In 
this study, we identify another 51 prefecture-level cities as the untreated (i.e., control) group 
based on the propensity score matching scheme (Didi did not enter the 51 cities during the study 
period). 
In sum, the key identification assumption we have to make to support a causal interpretation 
of this Difference in Difference estimate is that there are no unobserved, time-varying, city-
specific factors that are correlated with both Didi’s entry and new car sales, resulting in 
endogeneity. In other words, we assume that unobserved factors that could potentially jointly 
affect both Didi’s entry and new car sales do not systematically vary both between different 
cities and over time.  For instance, the following unobserved factors are accounted for in our 
estimate and do not bias our estimates: (1) city-specific time-invariant differences in new car 
sales (e.g., the number of new car sales in Shanghai overall being more likely to be higher than 
those of small cities in China).  This is the city fixed effect captured by Ac in Equation 1; (2) 
factors that vary arbitrarily over time but do not vary across cities (e.g., a generally increasing 
awareness of using Didi platform across all consumers in China over time). This is the month-
fixed effect captured by Bt in Equation 2; (3) city-specific trends, which allow for unobserved 
confounders that vary both between cities and over time (i.e., 𝒁𝑐𝑡𝑻𝑡 in Equation 2). 
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The first difference is taken using the city fixed effects, which allow for time-invariant 
differences in city new car sales between treated cites (i.e., Didi’s entry) and non-treated cities 
(i.e. no Didi entry). The second difference in our DID specification is taken over time using 
month fixed effects Bt which allow for unobserved time-varying car sale differences that are 
common across different cities. The coefficient of interest is Rct, which has the usual DID 
interpretation: it is an estimate of the percentage change in new car sales in treated cities 
subsequent to Didi’s entry compared against a baseline of changes in new car sales over the 
same time period in untreated (non-Didi entry) cities.  
We interpret a statistically significant negative coefficient on new car sales as indicating 
that Didi’s entry reduces the number of car sales. We interpret a coefficient that is not 
statistically different from zero as indicating that Didi’s entry has no effect on new car sales. 
(i.e., the null hypothesis). We interpret a positive coefficient as indicating that Didi’s entry 
stimulates new car sales. 
4.2 Falsification Examination 
It is possible that the main regressions will observe unauthentic concurrence entry effects. Some 
unobserved confounding factors may contribute to the relationship between Didi Chuxing and 
new car sales. To check the abovementioned DID parallel trend assumption and to understand 
how long it takes for significant effects to manifest, we evaluate whether any pre-entry events 
happening in the same period as Didi Chuxing’s expansion into various cities led to the 
variation of new car sales. Following Chan and Ghose (2013) and Greenwood and Wattal 
(2015), we carry out a falsification examination by including a placebo dummy variable in our 
regressions. A one month pre-entry dummy along with two months of post-entry dummies are 
used as placebos to examine possible inter-temporal entry effects as follows: 
Ln(𝑌𝑐𝑡) = 𝑨𝑐 + 𝑩𝑡 + 𝑔𝒁𝑐𝑡 + ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑗 𝑹𝒄𝒕
𝒋
 + 𝑒𝑐𝑡                                                                    (3) 
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where j belongs to {-1, 1, 2}, representing whether month t is the jth month since Didi Chuxing’s 
entry. We ignore the month of Didi Chuxing entry (𝑅𝑐𝑡 0) in our regressions. The coefficients 
of pre-entry placebo variables should be positive and significant if the main results are more 
likely to be caused by any pre-entry events happened in the same time period as that of Didi’s 
entry. The coefficients of the post-entry placebo variables would be positive and significant if 
Didi Chuxing’s entry increases new car sales. 
4.3 Exogeneity Concerns 
We were concerned that Didi Chuxing’s decision for entering into a city is endogenous and 
may be determined by unobserved passenger preferences predominant in a region. For example, 
a growth in the percentage of persons who prefer to hail a taxi would concurrently contribute 
to more new car sales and a higher likelihood of Didi Chuxing’s entry.  To ensure the validity 
of the causal relationship identified by the major findings, we must assure that the entry of Didi 
Chuxing is exogenous in its relationship to new car sales. To assess systematically if 
unobservable factors related to new car sales influence Didi Chuxing entry choices, we 
developed a hierarchical duration model (HDM) to forecast the entry of Didi Chuxing. The 
HDM includes demographic variables, socioeconomic factors, traffic intensity, the number of 
mobile phone subscriptions, and the number of new car sales as the predicative variables.  
In the duration models, the dependent variables are a series of zeros or ones, which 
indicates Didi Chuxing’s entry month in a city. By measuring the effect of Didi Chuxing’s entry 
on new car sales, we can effectively inspect whether the number of mobile phone subscriptions 
and other related demographic and socioeconomic factors correlated with the increase of new 
car sales determine the entry patterns. The coefficients for the number of new car sales of this 
examination can potentially identify absent variables bias and reverse causality harming our 
main regression results. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Base Model Regression  
Our base model regression results are provided in Table 2. Model 1 runs an unweighted 
regression and we find that the coefficient of the binary entry variable is positive and significant. 
The estimation implies that Didi Chuxing’s entry into a city can lead to a 6.5 percent increase 
(i.e., 277 new cars using the mean number of new car sales in the research sample as a reference 
point) in new car sales of the focal city per month4. Moreover, in Model 2, the regression is 
weighted by city population size and its results are very similar to those of Model 1 (i.e., the 
coefficients for the entry of Didi Chuxing are still positive and statistically significant). To 
examine the robustness of our base model regression results related to time-varying city factors, 
we include interaction terms of city covariates with various time periods in Model 3; the results 
remain basically unchanged.  
To examine further potential unobservable factors that may disturb the base model 
estimation, we re-estimate the base model using cities that have matched demographic factors 
and socioeconomic indicators.  This is achieved by using a propensity score matching scheme 
(as shown in Model 4).  We find that the regression coefficients are still positive and statistically 
significant and that a 21.4 percent increase in new car sales occurs following Didi’s entry. 
In addition, there are 13 cities in which Uber and Didi both entered in 2015, we do attempt 
to control for the potential effect of the introduction of Uber on car purchase by using search 
volume data to proxy for the popularity of Uber. ln(Uber) is the natural log of the Baidu index 
of search terms related to Uber including Uber and Youbu (Uber Chinese name and the search 
term is in Chinese). The Baidu Index data were collected for the search terms for each month. 
We re-estimate the Model 4 by including the control variable Ln(Uber) and we find that the 
regression coefficients are still positive and statistically significant, but the positive effect is 
                         
4 This estimation is reasonable given that the latest statistics report that the sales of new cars in China in May is over 840,000. 
Please refer to http://www.qichexl.com/a/xiaoliangpaixing/2017/0610/2944.html.  
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slightly weakened (as shown in Model 5). We further re-estimate the Model 4 using cities that 
only Didi entry in 2015. In other words, 13 cities that Didi and Uber entered at the same time 
and 13 matched cities (i.e. no Didi and Uber entry) are removed from our sample. The re-
estimation result is added into Table 2 as shown in Model 6. We also find that the regression 
coefficient of Model 6 is still positive and statistically significant (with the positive effect 
slightly weaker than that of Model 4).   
Table 2. The Impact of Didi’s Entry on New Car Sales (with Robustness Checks) 
Key Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Binary Entry (Didi 
Chuxing) 
0.065*** 0.062*** 0.055* 0.214*** 0.041*** 0.048*** 
(2.98) (4.08) (1.71) (5.50) (2.96) (2.81) 
Ln (Population Size) 0.250 0.749 0.170 29.610*** 0.768 0.755 
(0.35) (1.32) (0.41) (6.27) (1.39) (1.35) 
GDP Growth -0.412 -0.242 0.043 -7252.100*** -0.211 -0.226 
(-1.13) (-0.81) (0.18) (-6.04) (-0.73) (-0.76) 
Per Capita 
(Thousands) 
0.040 0.060* 0.057 11.910*** 0.063* 0.064* 
(1.32) (1.89) (1.65) (6.07) (1.93) (1.91) 
Ln (Mobile) 0.556*** 0.613*** 0.152 70.190*** 0.437** 0.424** 
(2.90) (3.45) (1.40) (6.14) (2.41) (2.18) 
Bus 0.002 0.000 0.002 15.540*** -0.001 -0.001 
(0.70) (0.02) (0.55) (6.07) (-0.44) (-0.75) 
Road -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -24.190*** -0.003 -0.003 
(-0.81) (-0.74) (-0.71) (-6.07) (-0.88) (-0.87) 
Taxi 0.168** 0.143** 0.083* -207.300*** 0.118** 0.118** 
 (2.29) (2.34) (1.74) (-6.09) (2.33) (2.41) 
Ln (Uber)     0.020** 0.022** 
     (2.33) (2.39) 
Constant 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.055* 0.214*** -4.206 -3.945 
(2.98) (4.08) (1.71) (5.50) (-0.88) (-0.78) 
Weighted by 
population 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control × Time Trend   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-Score Matched 
Samples 
  
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Only Didi Entry        Yes 
Observations 6192 6192 6192 6192 6192 5919 
Adjusted R2 0.961 0.962 0.965 0.911 0.962 0.958 
Note: The log number of new car sales is the dependent variable. Robust t-values are stated in parentheses below 
coefficients and clustered by city level. Model 1 is the unweighted regression, while Models 2–3 are weighted 
regressions All regressions employ an ordinary least squares specification. All models include city-level and 
month fixed effects. * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. 
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5.2 Falsification Examination 
We examine if the increase in new car sales already proliferated before Didi entry. We find that 
the number of new cars sold significantly increases after Didi Chuxing’s entry (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. New Car Sales Before and After Didi Chuxing’s Entry 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, in models 1 (unweighted) and 2 (weighted), the one-month pre-entry 
placebo dummy variable failed to capture any pre-entry Didi Chuxing influence. Thus, it is 
unlikely that the positive relationship between new car sales and Didi Chuxing’s entry found in 
prior regression results is a deceitful effect. It is also worth noting that the coefficient of the 
first entry month (i.e., Didi Chuxing Entry1) is not significant, suggesting that Didi Chuxing’s 
entry has a delayed effect on increasing new car sales. The effect on new car sales only occurs 
in the second month after Didi Chuxing’s entry, demonstrating a one-month delay between Didi 
Chuxing’s entry and its impact on new car sales. It is reasonable for the local new car sales to 
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increase several weeks after Didi Chuxing’s entry as potential drivers need one or two weeks 
to purchase and register cars with Didi Chuxing. We argue that the presence of non-first-month 
entry effects, as shown in Table 3 further confirms the validity of the effect captured by the 
entry variables. 
 
Table 3. Falsification Examination 
 Model 1 Model 2 
DiDi Entry-1 -0.005 0.023 
 (-0.21) (0.85) 
DiDi Entry1 0.025 0.046 
 (0.46) (0.96) 
DiDi Entry2 0.101*** 0.110*** 
 (3.57) (4.87) 
Log Population Size 0.251 0.746 
 (0.36) (1.35) 
GDP Growth -0.399 -0.230 
 (-1.14) (-0.80) 
Per Capita (Thousands) 0.039 0.058* 
 (1.31) (1.85) 
Log Mobile 0.565*** 0.625*** 
 (2.90) (3.50) 
Bus 0.002 0.000 
 (0.68) (0.04) 
Road -0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.79) (-0.72) 
Taxi 0.174** 0.144** 
 (2.37) (2.36) 
Constant -2.669 -7.115 
 (-0.51) (-1.50) 
Observations 6192 6192 
Weighted by population No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.960 0.962 
Note: The log number of new car sales is the dependent variable. 
Robust t-values are shown in parentheses below coefficients All 
regressions employ an ordinary least squares specification. All 
models include city-level and month fixed effects. * denotes p < 
0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. 
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5.3 Didi Chuxing’s Entry Exogeneity 
We were concerned whether potential unobservable variables related to new car sales influence 
Didi Chuxing’s entry decisions.  Consequently, we developed HDM including demographic 
variables, socioeconomic factors, and new car sales, to forecast Didi Chuxing’s entry. 
The results of the exogeneity examination offer insights into the estimation bias due to 
absence of unobservable variables and reverse causality.  As shown by models 1 & 2 in Table 
4, a number of demographic factors and the number of mobile subscriptions significantly 
influence Didi Chuxing’s entry. As the number of mobile phone users increases, the propensity 
to download and use Didi Chuxing is enhanced.  
As a new car sales variable is added in Model 3, we expect to observe effects driven 
from unobserved factors that determine the increase in new car sales and the entry of Didi 
Chuxing simultaneously. We find that the estimated coefficients on new car sales are not 
significant, suggesting that entry decisions have little relationship with the increase in new car 
sales over time and that it is unlikely there exist unobserved effects influencing new car sales 
and the entry of Didi Chuxing simultaneously. These empirical results confirm that Didi 
Chuxing’s entry is exogenous in its relationship with the new car sales.  We therefore reject the 
supposition that unobserved factors lead to the relationship between Didi Chuxing’s expansion 
and new car sales.  
 
Table 4. Hierarchical Duration Models Predicting Entry into Cities 
 Logistic Regression 
Key Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log Population Size 1.711*** -0.346 -0.191 
 (5.00) (-0.70) (-0.35) 
GDP Growth 29.99*** 25.920*** 29.660*** 
 (6.13) (5.32) (4.97) 
Per Capita (Thousands) 0.021*** 0.000 0.003 
 (3.57) (0.05) (0.24) 
Log Mobile  2.054*** 2.638*** 
  (6.02) (5.17) 
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Bus  -0.016* -0.017* 
  (-1.76) (-1.72) 
Road  0.002 0.001 
  (0.50) (0.43) 
Log New Car Sales   -0.579 
   (-1.57) 
Constant -17.89*** -36.20*** -41.510*** 
 (-7.95) (-11.43) (-8.22) 
Observations 6251 6193 6192 
Log likelihood -223.34 -203.73 -202.65 
Note: The dependent variable is a series of 0s or 1s in the month that Didi Chuxing 
enters into a city. Robust t-values are shown in parentheses below coefficients and 
clustered by city level. * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. 
 
5.5. The Impact on Specific Car Categories 
We have provided evidence that ride-hailing apps have a positive impact on the overall new car 
sales across China. In this section, we explore the heterogeneous impacts of ride-hailing apps 
across different car categories, and deliver detailed empirical evidence.   While ride-hailing 
apps can positively impact new car sales, it is unlikely that the overall growth of new car sales 
is consistent across all types of cars. We ran the regression models on five subsamples of 
different car models. Table 5 shows that the coefficients of Didi Chuxing’s entry are positive 
and significant for Toyota Corolla and two comparable models of Geely, suggesting that the 
entry of Didi Chuxing has the strongest impact on the sales of economy vehicle models. These 
economy models are the most preferred models for ride-hailing drivers not only because they 
are designed for low-cost purchase and fuel savings, but also because these car manufacturers 
offer special policies for Didi Chuxing drivers. For example, Geely offers a “ready-to-register” 
Didi Chuxing service for all customers so that all new car owners can immediately join the Didi 
Chuxing platform as its drivers.  As we expected, for business or luxury vehicle models (e.g., 
Toyota Camry and Mercedes Benz-C series), consumers’ purchasing decisions are not strongly 
motivated by the entry of Didi Chuxing.  
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Table 5. Estimates of Heterogeneity for Didi Chuxing’s Impact on New Car Sales 
Variables COROLLA GEELY_Dihao GEELY_Yuanjing CAMRY BENZ-
C 
Binary Entry 
(Didi Chuxing) 
0.247*** 0.233*** 1.146*** 0.097 0.140 
(5.03) (4.43) (5.84) (1.62) (1.49) 
Log Population 
Size 
-0.003 1.576 0.627 -0.544 0.167 
(-0.00) (0.73) (0.13) (-0.43) (0.12) 
GDP Growth -0.338 -1.113 1.609 0.213 -0.404 
(-0.53) (-0.89) (0.70) (0.37) (-0.63) 
Per Capita 
(Thousands) 
-0.013 0.167*** -0.149 0.043 -0.00479 
(-0.21) (3.40) (-1.35) (1.06) (-0.20) 
Log Mobile 1.964*** 1.364*** 5.599*** -1.049*** 1.041** 
(4.47) (3.76) (6.07) (-4.83) (2.64) 
Bus 0.032*** 0.011 0.016 -0.005 0.00243 
(2.97) (1.36) (1.13) (-0.88) (0.20) 
Road -0.006 -0.003 0.024 -0.010* 0.00941 
(-0.87) (-0.58) (1.07) (-2.01) (1.04) 
Taxi 0.236 0.339** 0.622** -0.120 0.149 
 (1.37) (2.21) (2.34) (-0.94) (0.55) 
Constant -30.710** -45.470*** -97.350** 27.25** -17.33 
(-2.69) (-2.92) (-2.15) (2.61) (-1.41) 
Weighted by 
population 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6539 4159 2911 6518 11528 
Adjusted R2 0.864 0.885 0.664 0.897 0.357 
Note: The dependent variable is the log number of new car sales. Robust t-values are shown in 
parentheses below coefficients and clustered by city level. All regressions employ an ordinary 
least squares specification. All models include city-level and month fixed effects. * denotes p 
< 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01.. 
 
6. Discussion and Implications 
Online collaborative consumption platforms have emerged as a major trend in recent years, 
partly driven by the continued strong penetration of smartphones and tablets, and the prevalence 
of the mobile Internet. In this research, we empirically examine the impact of the entry of Didi 
Chuxing, the leading peer-to-peer car service in China, on new car sales in 51 cities across the 
country. Our study provides compelling evidence that shows the positive impact of Didi 
Chuxing’s entry on new car sales. Based on Didi Chuxing’s different entry times into various 
cities, we can assess the overall effect of this new platform’s entry on new car sales. Our 
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empirical results suggest that, while the long term impacts of these emerging platforms remain 
to be seen, sharing economy platforms with dominant market shares can meaningfully change 
consumption behavior and market dynamics in the short run.  Our results are consistent with 
previous studies demonstrating that Internet-enabled two-sided platforms, once reach critical 
mass, can rapidly change market dynamics, especially in those markets subject to strong 
network effects and herding (Brynjolfsson et al., 2003; Kauffman and Li, 2003; 2005; 
Constantinides and Barrett, 2014; Li et al., 2014).  It is worth noting that, like the impacts of 
many other technological breakthroughs, the positive impact on new car sales documented in 
our study is likely to be transitory (Li, et al., 2006).  We believe that, in order to leverage the 
ride-hailing platforms to achieve sustainable benefits in the long run, market players need to 
design appropriate incentive mechanisms and to build relational contracts that promote 
reciprocity and mutual trust (Kauffman, et al., 2010, Li, 2014).  
Our study has several important managerial implications. The entry-induced increase in 
new car sales can benefit economy car manufacturers, especially those that directly partner with 
ride-hailing platforms. As economy model cars are well suited for ride-hailing drivers, certain 
business and marketing strategies, such as launching economy vehicle models or offering 
special ride-hailing driver-partner discounts, can effectively target potential ride-hailing drivers.  
On the contrary, as the entry of Didi Chuxing has little effect on the sales of business and luxury 
vehicle models, manufacturers of these models will not meaningfully benefit from ride-hailing 
platforms, at least in the short run.  
By identifying those car models and manufacturers that experience nontrivial increases 
in new car sales due to the prevalence of ride-hailing platforms like Didi Chuxing, our results 
provide policy makers with a number of insights into how they can better design 
policies/regulations for different market segments. Moreover, environmental protection policy 
makers can more effectively reduce fuel consumption and alleviate pollutions by incentivizing 
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car manufacturers to develop new car models and fuel technologies that can better leverage the 
emerging platforms.  
Our paper has a few limitations, some of which represent future research opportunities 
in this area. First, our findings are obtained based on the entry timing of China’s leading ride-
hailing platform, Didi Chuxing, and local new car sales in various Chinese cities. Thus, 
generalizing our results to other countries may not be appropriate because of many country-
specific market characteristics and industry policies. Therefore, future studies may be needed 
to investigate the impacts of ride-hailing apps in other major auto markets (e.g., Uber in the 
USA). The second limitation of our study is that it only examines the impact of Didi Chuxing’s 
entry (it is possible that auto market dynamics may be influenced by the entry of a second-tier 
ride-hailing platform like Yidao). Nevertheless, as these second-tier players have trivial market 
shares and negligible growth in China, it is unlikely that our major findings are significantly 
biased because of their presence.  Lastly, Didi Chuxing does not disclose the private information 
of its platform drivers, and consequently we cannot investigate how demographic factors (e.g., 
race, gender, age, or socio-economic status) influence new car sales driven by Didi Chuxing’s 
market entry.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Didi Chuxing Entry Timing 
No. Province Enter City Didi Chuxing Density of population (person/per square kilometer) 
1 Anhui Hefei Jun-2015 825 
2 Beijing Beijing May-2015 1525 
3 Chongqing Chongqin May-2015 1872 
4 Fujian Fuzhou Jun-2015 593 
5 Fujian Quanzhou Jun-2015 635 
6 Fujian Xiamen Jun-2015 1220 
7 Guangdong Dongguan Jun-2015 3349 
8 Guangdong Foshan Jun-2015 2717 
9 Guangdong Guangzhou May-2015 1859 
10 Guangdong Huizhou Jun-2015 447 
11 Guangdong Shenzhen May-2015 5551 
12 Guangdong Zhongshan Jun-2015 1784 
13 Guangdong Zhuhai Jun-2015 989 
14 Guangxi Nanning Jun-2015 301 
15 Hainan Sanya Jun-2015 357 
16 Hebei Shijiazhuang Jun-2015 646 
17 Hebei Tangshan Jun-2015 574 
18 Heilongjiang Harbin Jun-2015 200 
19 Henan Luoyang Jun-2015 423 
20 Henan Zhengzhou Jun-2015 1149 
21 Hubei Wuhan May-2015 1152 
22 Hunan Changsha Jun-2015 596 
23 Jiangsu Changzhou Jun-2015 1050 
24 Jiangsu Huai'an Jun-2015 536 
25 Jiangsu Nanjing Jun-2015 1213 
26 Jiangsu Nantong Jun-2015 852 
27 Jiangsu Suzhou Jun-2015 1233 
28 Jiangsu Wuxi Jun-2015 1331 
29 Jiangsu Xuzhou Jun-2015 762 
30 Jiangsu Yanghzou Jun-2015 672 
31 Jilin Changchun Jun-2015 373 
32 Liaoning Dalian Jun-2015 505 
33 Shandong Dongying Jun-2015 626 
34 Liaoning Shengyang Jun-2015 838 
35 Shaanxi Xi'an Jun-2015 229 
36 Shandong Jinan Jun-2015 743 
37 Shandong Linyi Jun-2015 630 
38 Shandong Qingdao Jun-2015 694 
39 Shandong Weihai Jun-2015 444 
40 Shandong Yantai Jun-2015 473 
41 Shanxi Taiyuan Jun-2015 604 
42 Sichuan Chengdu May-2015 1158 
43 Tianjin Tianjin May-2015 1270 
44 Yunnan Kunming Jun-2015 299 
45 Zhejiang Hangzhou May-2015 543 
46 Zhejiang Jiaxing Jun-2015 1150 
47 Zhejiang Jinhua Jun-2015 491 
48 Zhejiang Ningbo Jun-2015 786 
49 Zhejiang Shaoxing Jun-2015 595 
50 Zhejiang Taizhou Jun-2015 634 
51 Zhejiang Wenzhou Jun-2015 774 
 
